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Reserve Bank of India
The current ongoing ﬁ  nancial crisis is attributed to a variety of factors such as the developments in the 
subprime mortgage sector, excessive leverage, lax ﬁ  nancial regulation and supervision, and global 
macroeconomic imbalances. At a fundamental level, however, the crisis also reﬂ  ects the effects of long 
periods of excessively loose monetary policy in the major advanced economies during the early part of 
this decade. 
The theory and belief of efﬁ  cient and rational markets have been severely discredited by the current crisis. 
There is, therefore, a growing agreement for much strengthened, and perhaps, intrusive regulation and 
supervision in the ﬁ  nancial sector. Hitherto unregulated institutions, markets and instruments will now 
have to be brought under the regulatory framework. A more developed macroprudential approach will 
be important. Once the current ﬁ  nancial crisis is beyond us, minimum regulatory capital requirements 
would need to be signiﬁ  cantly above existing Basel rules, with emphasis on Tier I capital, and supported 
by a maximum gross leverage ratio. Liquidity regulation and supervision must be recognised as of equal 
importance to capital regulation, reinforced by an effective global liquidity framework for managing liquidity 
in large, cross-border ﬁ  nancial institutions. The issue of remuneration in the ﬁ  nancial sector would require 
reforms on an industry-wide basis so that improved risk management and compensation practices by 
some systemically important ﬁ  rms are not undermined by the unsound practices of others. Whereas the 
suggested reform principles are being increasingly well accepted, many challenges will arise on their modes 
of implementation, and their practicality. For instance, once normalcy returns, the ﬁ  nancial industry will do 
its utmost to resist the requirements for higher capital at that time. 
From the point of view of emerging market economies (EMEs), the volatility in capital ﬂ  ows – mainly the 
outcome of extant monetary policy regimes in developed countries – has led to severe problems in both 
macro management and ﬁ  nancial regulation. This will remain a challenge since there is little international 
discussion on this issue. Finally, as the global economy starts recovery, a calibrated exit from the prevalent 
unprecedented accommodative monetary policy will have to be ensured to avoid the recurrence of the 
ﬁ  nancial crisis being experienced now.
NB: The assistance of Anand Sinha, Prashant Saran, P.R. Ravi Mohan, T. Gopinath, and Muneesh Kapur in preparation of the paper is gratefully acknowledged. 
The paper has also beneﬁ  ted from the Report of the Working Group I of the G20 on “Enhancing sound regulation and strengthening transparency”.
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T
he world is currently in the midst of the most 
severe ﬁ  nancial and economic crisis since the 
Great Depression. Although the crisis originated 
in the subprime mortgage market in the United States, 
it then spread to Europe and later to the rest of the 
world.  The speed of the contagion that spread across 
the world is perhaps unprecedented.  What started off 
as a relatively limited crisis in the US housing mortgage 
sector turned successively into a widespread banking 
crisis in the United States and Europe, the breakdown 
of both domestic and international ﬁ  nancial markets, 
and then later into a full blown global economic crisis. 
Almost all governments and central banks of the world 
have been busy over the last 9-18 months in an effort 
to contain the effects of the crisis through both ﬁ  scal 
and monetary policy measures, respectively. Just as 
the global nature of the crisis is unprecedented, so is 
the global nature of the response, as exempliﬁ  ed by 
the coordinated action being committed to by the G20.
Along with the coordinated ﬁ  scal and monetary 
policy actions, a comprehensive re-examination of 
the ﬁ  nancial regulatory and supervisory framework 
is also underway around the world. 
Against this backdrop, this paper attempts to analyse the 
emerging contours of regulation of ﬁ  nancial institutions 
with an emphasis on the emerging challenges and 
dynamics. The paper is organised as follows: 
￿ Section I provides a broad overview of the global 
developments which contributed to the current 
global ﬁ  nancial crisis. 
￿ Section II presents the ongoing discussion and 
debate at the international level in the light of the 
shortcomings of the extant regulatory framework.  
￿ Section III analyses proposals for reforming the 
regulatory framework, while 
￿  Section IV discusses the difﬁ  culties  in 
implementing the regulatory proposals.
1| EVOLUTION OF CRISIS: 
  WHAT WENT WRONG?
What are some of the identiﬁ  able sources of market 
failures that led to the current ﬁ  nancial turbulence? 
The current ongoing ﬁ   nancial crisis is attributed 
to a variety of factors such as the developments in 
the subprime mortgage sector, excessive leverage, 
lax ﬁ  nancial regulation and supervision, and global 
macroeconomic imbalances. At a fundamental level, 
however, the crisis also reﬂ  ects the effects of long 
periods of excessively loose monetary policy in the 
major advanced economies during the early part of 
this decade.
After the dotcom bubble burst in the United States 
around the turn of the decade, monetary policy 
in the United States and then in other advanced 
economies was eased relatively aggressively. Policy 
rates in the United States reached 1.0 per cent in 2002, 
and were held around these levels for an extended 
period, longer than was probably necessary (Taylor, 
2009; Yellen, 2009).  Excessively loose monetary 
policy led to excess liquidity and consequent low 
interest rates worldwide; and the burst of ﬁ  nancial 
innovation during this period ampliﬁ  ed  and 
accelerated the consequences of excess liquidity 
and rapid credit expansion (Larosière Report, 
2009).
What is interesting about this episode is that, despite 
the persistent accommodative monetary policy, the 
accompanying strong worldwide macroeconomic 
growth did not result in measured inﬂ  ationary 
pressures in goods and most services.  Consequently, 
central banks in advanced economies, particularly 
in the United States, did not withdraw monetary 
accommodation for an extended period. The excess 
liquidity worldwide did show up in rising asset 
prices, and later in commodity prices, particularly 
oil.  It was only then that measured inﬂ  ation did start 
rising and central banks began to tighten monetary 
policy, though belatedly. 
With signiﬁ   cant increases in both investment 
and consumption, along with declining savings,1 
aggregate demand exceeded domestic output in 
the United States for an extended period, leading to 
persistent and increasing current account deﬁ  cits, 
as the domestic savings investment imbalance grew.   
This large excess demand of the United States was 
supplied by the rest of the world, especially China, 
which provided goods and services at relatively 
low cost, leading to corresponding current account 
surpluses in China and elsewhere. The surpluses 
generated by the oil exporting countries added to 
the emerging global imbalances. 
1  The US personal saving rate hovered only slightly above zero from mid-2005 to mid-2007 (Yellen, 2009).
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Large current account surpluses in China and other 
emerging market economies (EMEs) and equivalent 
deﬁ  cits in the United States and elsewhere are often 
attributed to the exchange rate policies in China, 
other EMEs and oil exporters. Given the fact that 
the US demand exceeded output, it is apparent that 
the US  current deﬁ   cit would have continued at 
its elevated levels. In the event of a more ﬂ  exible 
exchange rate policy in China, the sources of imports 
for the United States would have been some countries 
other than China.  Although the lack of exchange rate 
ﬂ  exibility in the Asian EMEs and oil exporters did 
contribute to the emergence of global imbalances, it 
can not fully explain the large and growing current 
account deﬁ  cits in the United States, particularly 
since Europe as a whole did not exhibit current 
account deﬁ  cits at the same time.
Accommodative monetary policy and the 
corresponding existence of low interest rates for 
an extended period encouraged the active search 
for higher yields by a host of market participants. 
Thus capital ﬂ  ows to EMEs surged in search of 
higher yields, but could not be absorbed by these 
economies in the presence of either large current 
account surpluses or only small deﬁ  cits, largely 
ending up as ofﬁ  cial reserves.  These reserves were 
recycled into US government securities and those 
of the government sponsored mortgage entities 
such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Thus, while 
accommodative monetary policy kept short-term 
interest rates low, the recycled reserves contributed 
to the lowering of long-term interest rates in the 
advanced economies, particularly the United States.   
Such low long-term interest rates contributed to the 
growth of mortgage ﬁ  nance and consequent rising 
housing prices.
Furthermore, the stable macroeconomic 
environment – relatively stable growth and low 
inﬂ  ation – in the major advanced economies in the 
run up to the crisis led to sustained under-pricing of 
risks and hence excessive risk taking and ﬁ  nancial 
innovation. It may be ironic that the perceived success 
of central banks and increased credibility of monetary 
policy, giving rise to enhanced expectations with 
regard to stability in both inﬂ  ation and interest rates, 
could have led to the mispricing of risk and hence 
enhanced risk taking. Easy monetary policy itself 
may have generated a search for yields that resulted 
in a dilution of standards in assessing credit risk 
leading to erosion of sound practices (Mohan, 2007). 
Lower yields encouraged excessive leverage as banks 
and ﬁ  nancial institutions attempted to maintain 
their proﬁ  tability.  Lacunae in ﬁ  nancial regulation 
and supervision allowed this excessive leverage in 
the ﬁ  nancial system.  Assets were either taken off 
banks’ balance sheets to off-balance sheet vehicles 
that were effectively unregulated; or ﬁ  nancial 
innovation synthetically reduced the perceived 
risks on balance sheets.
The sustained rise in asset prices, particularly house 
prices, on the back of excessively accommodative 
monetary policy, and lax lending standards 
coupled with ﬁ  nancial innovations, resulted in 
the high growth in mortgage credit to households, 
particularly to low credit quality households. Due to 
the ‘originate-to-distribute’ model, most of these 
mortgages were securitised. In combination 
with strong growth in complex credit 
derivatives and with the use of credit ratings, 
the mortgages, inherently subprime, were 
bundled into a variety of tranches, including 
AAA tranches, and sold to a range of ﬁ  nancial 
investors looking for higher yields. 
As inﬂ  ation started creeping up beginning in 2004, 
the US Federal Reserve did start to withdraw monetary 
accommodation. Consequently, mortgage payments 
started rising, while housing prices started to ease. 
Low/negligible margin ﬁ  nancing incentivised default 
by the subprime borrowers. Although the loans were 
supposedly securitised and sold to the off-balance 
sheet special investment vehicles (SIVs), the losses 
were ultimately borne by the banks and ﬁ  nancial 
institutions wiping off a signiﬁ  cant fraction of their 
capital. The uncertainty about the extent of the 
likely bank losses led to a breakdown of trust among 
banks. Given the growing ﬁ  nancial globalisation, 
banks and ﬁ  nancial institutions in other major 
advanced economies, especially Europe, have 
also been adversely affected by losses and capital 
write-offs. Inter-bank money markets nearly froze 
and this was reﬂ  ected in very high spreads in money 
markets and debt markets. There was aggressive 
search for safety, which has been mirrored in 
very low yields on Treasury bills and bonds. 
These developments were signiﬁ  cantly accentuated 
following the failure of Lehman Brothers in 
September  2008 and there was a complete loss 
of conﬁ  dence. 
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The deep and lingering crisis in global ﬁ  nancial 
markets, the extreme level of risk aversion, the 
mounting losses of banks and ﬁ  nancial institutions, 
the elevated level of commodity and oil prices 
(until the third quarter of 2008), and the sharp 
correction in a range of asset prices, all combined, 
have suddenly led to the sharp slowdown in growth 
momentum in the major advanced economies, 
especially since the Lehman failure. Global growth 
for 2009, which was seen at a healthy 3.8 per cent 
in April 2008 is now expected by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) to contract by – 1.3 per cent. 
Thus, the causes for the current crisis reﬂ  ect the 
interaction of monetary policy, the choice of 
exchange rate regime in a number of countries 
and important changes within the ﬁ  nancial system 
itself (Larosière Report, 2009; Bank for International 
Settlements, 2008), along with lax regulation arising 
from the belief in efﬁ  cient markets and light touch 
regulation. To recap, low interest rates, together 
with increasing and excessive optimism about the 
future pushed up asset prices, from stock prices 
to housing prices. Low interest rates and limited 
volatility prompted the search for yield down the 
credit quality curve, and underestimation of risks 
led to creation and purchase of riskier assets. 
Central banks, focused on measured consumer price 
inﬂ  ation and aggregate activity, while neglecting 
asset price movements, did not perceive the 
full implications of the growing risks until it was 
too late (IMF, 2009).  
2| SHORTCOMINGS IN FINANCIAL
  REGULATION AND SUPERVISION
There have been calls for fundamental rethinking 
on macroeconomic, monetary and ﬁ  nancial sector 
policies to meet the new challenges and realities, 
which perhaps represent a structural shift in the 
international ﬁ  nancial  architecture  demanding 
potentially enhanced degree of coordination among 
monetary authorities and regulators. A review of the 
policies relating to ﬁ  nancial regulation, in a way, 
needs to address both the acute policy dilemmas in 
the short run and a fundamental rethink on broader 
frameworks of ﬁ  nancial and economic policies over 
the medium-term (Reddy, 2008).
A great deal of very active discussion is now going on 
internationally on the existing regulatory practices 
and the future of ﬁ  nancial regulation and supervision. 
It is also perhaps correct to say that there is an 
emerging consensus on the directions that need to 
be taken on ﬁ  nancial regulation and supervision. 
Among the most inﬂ  uential reports on this issue are:
￿  Report of the High Level Group on Financial 
Supervision in the European Union (Chairman: 
Jacques de Larosière).
￿ The structure of ﬁ  nancial supervision: Approaches 
and challenges in a global market place (Group of 
Thirty; Chairman: Paul A. Volcker).
￿ The fundamental principles of ﬁ  nancial regulation 
(The Geneva Report).
￿ The Turner Review: A regulatory response to the 
global banking crisis (Financial Services Authority 
of the United Kingdom); and ﬁ  nally,
￿ the Report of Working Group I on “Enhancing sound 
regulation and strengthening transparency” (G20).
What is common among all these reports is the 
acknowledgement that regulation and supervision 
in the advanced economies was clearly too lax in 
recent times and that there needs to be considerable 
rethinking leading to much strengthened, and 
perhaps, intrusive regulation and supervision in the 
ﬁ  nancial sector.  There is clear recognition of serious 
regulatory and supervisory failures.
The root of such rethinking is really the questioning 
of the existing intellectual assumptions with respect 
to the functioning of markets, and the nature of 
ﬁ  nancial risk.  To quote the Turner Review: 
“At the core of these assumptions has been the theory of 
efﬁ  cient and rational markets.  Five propositions with 
implications for regulatory approach have followed:
(i) Market prices are good indicators of rationally 
evaluated economic value.
(ii)  The development of securitised credit, since 
based on the creation of new and more liquid 
markets, has improved both allocative efﬁ  ciency and 
ﬁ  nancial stability.
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(iii) The risk characteristics of ﬁ  nancial markets can be 
inferred from mathematical analysis, delivering robust 
quantitative measures of trading risk.
(iv) Market discipline can be used as an effective tool 
in constraining harmful risk taking.
(v)  Financial innovation can be assumed to be 
beneﬁ  cial since market competition would winnow 
out any innovations which did not deliver value added.
Each of these assumptions is now subject to extensive 
challenge on both theoretical and empirical grounds, 
with potential implications for the appropriate 
design of regulation and for the role of regulatory 
authorities”. (Turner Review, 2009, page 30)
What were the speciﬁ  c developments in the ﬁ  nancial 
system that arose from these broadly accepted 
intellectual assumptions that led to the ongoing 
global ﬁ  nancial crisis?
Financial and banking crises have a long history, 
which is as old as the existence of the ﬁ  nancial sector 
itself. What is common among almost all crises is the 
build up of excessive leverage in the system and 
the inevitable bursting of the ﬁ  nancial bubble that 
results from such leverage.  What is interesting about 
the current crisis is that this excess leverage occurred 
over a period when greater consensus had developed 
through the Basel process on the need for and level 
of adequate capital required in banking institutions 
across all major jurisdictions. Furthermore, 
sophisticated ﬁ  nancial risk management capabilities 
were also believed to have been developed within 
large ﬁ  nancial institutions during this period of 
unusually high rapid growth in both the magnitude 
and sophistication of the ﬁ  nancial system.  With 
ﬁ  nancial deregulation in key jurisdiction like the 
United States and the United Kingdom, along with 
most other countries, ﬁ  nancial institutions also 
grew in complexity.  Financial conglomerates began 
to include all ﬁ  nancial functions under one roof: 
banking, insurance, asset management, proprietary 
trading, investment banking, broking, and the like.   
The consequence has been inadequate appreciation 
and assessment of the emerging risks, both within 
institutions and system wide.  What were the factors 
that led to this emergence of excessive system wide 
and institutional risk?
Among the notable developments of the last 
decade has been the unprecedented explosive 
growth of securitised credit intermediation 
and associated derivatives (Yellen, 2009). The 
assumption underlying this development was that 
this constituted a mechanism that took risk off the 
balance sheets of banks, placing it with a diversiﬁ  ed 
set of investors, and thereby serving to reduce 
banking system risks.  As late as April 2006, the 
IMF’s global ﬁ  nancial stability Report noted that this 
dispersion would help “mitigate and absorb shocks to 
the ﬁ  nancial system” with the result that “improved 
resilience may be seen in fewer bank failures and 
more consistent credit provision” (as quoted in the 
Turner Report, page 42).
This assumption has already proved to be erroneous, 
although simple forms of securitisation have existed 
for a long time.  Among the key functions of banks is 
maturity transformation: they intermediate shorter 
term liabilities to fund longer term assets in the 
non ﬁ  nancial sector.  Banks are typically highly 
leveraged and hence trust and conﬁ  dence is crucial 
to their functioning and stability. Traditionally, 
therefore, banks exercised sharp vigilance on the 
risk elements of their assets, which were typically 
illiquid, in order to ensure constant rollover of their 
shorter-term  funding liabilities.  What securitisation 
does is to turn illiquid assets into liquid ones, 
which in theory then disperse risks from the 
banks’ balance sheets and also reduce their 
requirements of banking capital. With assets 
themselves seen as liquid short-term instruments, 
they began to be funded by ultra short-term 
liabilities, including even overnight repos whose 
volume increased manifold in recent years. 
Systemic risk increased because traded instruments 
are inherently more susceptible to price swings 
depending on changes in market sentiment.   
Furthermore, liquidity risks in such markets were 
also not understood adequately.  It was assumed that 
these liquid markets would always exist, and hence 
securitised assets were assumed to be inherently 
less risky than illiquid long-term credit assets.
Financial innovation arising from the search 
for yields compounded this problem as 
second order derivatives proliferated and their 
valuation became increasingly dependent on 
model valuation and credit ratings, rather than 
FSR13_MOHAN.indd   107 FSR13_MOHAN.indd   107 01/07/2009   16:07:15 01/07/2009   16:07:15ARTICLES
Rakesh Mohan: “Emerging contours of ﬁ  nancial regulation: challenges and dynamics”
108  Banque de France ￿ Financial Stability Review ￿ No. 13 – The future of ﬁ  nancial regulation ￿ September 2009
observable and transparent market valuation, 
and hence inherently more opaque.  Thus, when 
problems arose in these markets and prices were 
not visible, valuation of the assets of banks and 
the shadow banking system became unobservable.   
Consequently, trust and conﬁ  dence evaporated 
and markets froze. 
Compounding these problems was the emergence 
of the shadow banking system that took off assets 
from the banks’ balance sheets, thereby reducing 
the latter’s capital requirements. The complexity 
and magnitude of intra-ﬁ  nancial sector transactions 
exploded over this past decade, particularly over  the 
past ﬁ  ve years.  Thus the ﬁ  nancial sector increasingly 
served itself, exhibiting high proﬁ  ts and growth, while 
doing relatively little for the non ﬁ  nancial sectors of 
the economy, which the ﬁ  nancial sector exists to 
serve in principle. The debt of ﬁ  nancial companies 
increased to levels exceeding the GDP of leading 
economies. Thus, in the process of taking risks off 
balance sheets through securitisation, these risks 
returned to the extended banking system itself and 
the original rationale for securitisation got belied.   
Rather than reducing systemic risk the system of 
complex securitisation and associated derivatives 
only served to increase systemic risk.  Moreover, it 
became increasingly difﬁ  cult to trace where the risk 
ultimately lay.
The regulatory system was clearly behind the 
curve in taking account of these developments.   
The procedures for calculating risk-based capital 
requirements under-estimated the risks inherent 
in traded securitised instruments, thereby adding 
to the incentive for banks to securitise assets into 
traded instruments, which bore lower risks weights.   
The trading of these instruments has largely been 
in over-the-counter (OTC) markets that exhibit little 
transparency.  As a result of this overall process, banks 
became effectively under capitalised, and the leverage 
ratios of the unregulated shadow banking system 
and investment banks reached unsustainable levels.
With the existence of low interest rates, mispriced low 
risk perceptions, and inherent incentives to originate 
lending and distribute securitised instruments, 
household indebtedness increased to unprecedented 
levels, particularly for housing. Demand for housing 
assets rose and hence housing prices. Thus micro 
behaviour led to increased systemic risk that was not 
adequately appreciated or understood, and hence 
not monitored by the authorities.
Thus there are immense emerging challenges that 
confront ﬁ  nancial sector regulators as a consequence 
of the ongoing global ﬁ  nancial crisis.
We can look forward to extensive debate at both the 
academic level and among practitioners.  How will 
we change our view on the efﬁ  ciency and rationality 
of markets, particularly ﬁ  nancial markets?  What 
will be the effect of such re-examination on ﬁ  nancial 
innovation in the future?  What will regulatory 
authorities do in the meantime while these 
debates are settled at the intellectual level?  Will 
they overreact and restrict ﬁ  nancial growth in the 
months and years to come?  Will this affect global 
GDP growth as well?
I now turn to the key proposals that are now being 
made for overhaul of the strong ﬁ  nancial regulatory 
architecture.
3| REFORMING 
  THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK: 
  THE FUTURE PERSPECTIVE
A great deal of discussion is going on at both the 
national and international levels on reform of the 
ﬁ  nancial regulatory system to address the various 
weaknesses that have emerged.  There is no question 
that ﬁ  nancial regulation has to be strengthened all 
round.  Hitherto unregulated institutions, markets 
and instruments will now have to be brought under 
the regulatory framework, and the framework itself 
will need to be redesigned to address the emerging 
needs at both national and international levels.   
As this new enthusiasm for ﬁ  nancial regulation 
unfolds, it is important that we keep in mind the 
basic functions of the ﬁ  nancial system, and how 
they can be strengthened so that the needs of the 
real economy are better served.
We need to ensure that the ﬁ  nancial  system 
continues to play a vital role in intermediating 
savings for providing adequate levels of funding to 
the real sector, thereby supporting economic growth.   
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It needs to be recognised that ﬁ  nancial markets will 
remain global and interconnected, while ﬁ  nancial 
innovation would continue to be important to foster 
economic efﬁ  ciency.  Hence, while strengthening 
ﬁ  nancial regulation and supervision, an endeavour 
has to be made in this process to be careful not to 
stiﬂ  e entrepreneurship and ﬁ  nancial innovation. But 
the following question needs to be constantly asked: 
“Financial innovation towards what objective?” 
As long as ﬁ  nancial innovation is seen to promote 
price discovery, greater intermediation efﬁ  ciency, 
and hence, overall efﬁ  ciency and growth, it must 
be encouraged, but with appropriate safeguards 
to maintain ﬁ   nancial stability. Unproductive 
ﬁ   nancial innovation, however, will need to be 
discouraged.  Moreover, the debate on ﬁ  nancial 
innovation and regulation has to be considered in 
terms of potential and systematic relevance of such 
innovations besides the capabilities for bringing 
them effectively under the regulatory umbrella 
(Mohan, 2007).  Therefore, there is a need for reform 
of the regulatory framework to shield the ﬁ  nancial 
system from potential crises, while identifying 
measures to mitigate the consequences of any future 
episodes of ﬁ  nancial stress.
The regulatory framework will need to keep pace 
with the associated risks in a more rapid and effective 
manner.  Large complex ﬁ  nancial institutions will 
continue to operate in multiple jurisdictions in 
order to meet the needs of their large global clients, 
and supervision will need to be better coordinated 
internationally with a robust global resolution 
framework.  In order to avoid regulatory arbitrage, 
there is a need for greater consistency in the 
regulation of similar instruments and of institutions 
performing similar activities, both within and 
across borders.
In addition, capital markets will require greater 
emphasis on reducing counterparty risk and on 
ensuring that their infrastructure allows them to 
remain a source of funding during periods of stress. 
The post-crisis period is likely to be characterised by 
a ﬁ  nancial system which functions with lower levels 
of leverage, reduced funding mismatches (both in 
terms of maturity and currency), less exposure 
to counterparty risk, and greater transparency 
regarding ﬁ   nancial instruments. After credit 
markets recover from the crisis, it will be important 
to mitigate the inevitable pressure to expand proﬁ  ts 
through increased risk-taking. A more developed 
macroprudential approach will be important in 
this context.
 
The type, size, and cross-border exposures of 
institutions and markets that will emerge from 
this crisis are likely to be considerably different 
from before.  As banks and ﬁ  nancial institutions 
consolidate, policy makers will have to adapt 
prudential regulation to varying degrees of size 
and concentration.  Similarly, competition policy 
will be important in ensuring healthy competition. 
Financial institutions, markets and instruments 
will therefore continue to evolve in ways that 
pose challenges for regulation, notwithstanding 
the retrenchment that is currently underway.   
Financial institutions, policymakers, supervisors 
and regulators will all need to become better 
equipped to manage the interconnectedness of 
markets, both domestically and globally, the effects 
of innovation, and the potential for incentives to 
become misaligned.  
It will be necessary to consider the appropriate 
timing for changes in the regulatory framework 
going forward. Recommendations should 
promote proportionate regulatory reaction when 
needed, acknowledging the possible limits of the 
self-regulation approach in some contexts.  For 
example, while ultimately capital buffers for the 
system should be enhanced during the economic 
expansion in order to be drawn down as needed in 
downturns, changes in the current environment 
may have negative consequences on the real 
economy.  A considered and comprehensive review 
of the consequences of reforms and harmonisation, 
coordinated across jurisdictions, is necessary to 
increase the effective transition to a more stable 
ﬁ  nancial system (G20, 2009).
In short, the overarching mandate of reforms is 
to make regulatory regimes more effective over 
the cycle. This is related to many other issues 
including certain aspects of compensation schemes 
at ﬁ  nancial institutions, of margin requirements and 
risk management practices focused on value-at-risk 
calculations based on short historical samples, of the 
capital adequacy framework, and of valuation and 
loan-loss provisioning practices.  In addition, there 
is a need to redeﬁ  ne the scope of the regulatory 
framework in order to establish appropriate oversight 
FSR13_MOHAN.indd   109 FSR13_MOHAN.indd   109 01/07/2009   16:07:15 01/07/2009   16:07:15ARTICLES
Rakesh Mohan: “Emerging contours of ﬁ  nancial regulation: challenges and dynamics”
110  Banque de France ￿ Financial Stability Review ￿ No. 13 – The future of ﬁ  nancial regulation ￿ September 2009
for the institutions and markets that may be the 
source of systemic risk.  Risk management also needs 
to be enhanced to better evaluate vulnerabilities 
arising from low-frequency, system-wide risks, and 
to better mitigate these risks.    
Against this broad background, this section 
endeavours to focus on deﬁ  ning the priorities for 
action in so far as ﬁ  nancial regulation and supervision 
are concerned.  
3|1  Macroprudential orientation  
As observed, the build up of micro institutional risks 
has resulted in the unfolding of massive macrorisk, 
partly through the rise in unsustainable asset 
prices. As a supplement to sound microprudential 
and market integrity regulation, national ﬁ  nancial 
regulatory frameworks therefore should be reinforced 
with a macroprudential oversight that promotes a 
system-wide approach to ﬁ  nancial regulation and 
supervision and mitigates the build-up of observable 
excess risks across the system. Prudential regimes 
should encourage behaviour that supports systemic 
stability; discourages regulatory arbitrage; and adopts 
the concept of ‘systemic’ risk, factoring in the effects 
of leverage and funding.  In most jurisdictions, this 
will require improved coordination mechanisms 
between various ﬁ  nancial authorities, mandates for 
all ﬁ  nancial authorities to take account of ﬁ  nancial 
system stability, and effective tools to address 
systemic risks. It will also require an effective 
global table, which is now proposed to be the 
Financial Stability Board, to bring together national 
ﬁ  nancial authorities to jointly assess systemic risks 
across the global ﬁ  nancial system and coordinate 
policy responses.
A number of policy institutions, particularly central 
banks, have enhanced their analysis of systemic risks 
in recent years – many of the systemic vulnerabilities 
that caused or enhanced the current turmoil had 
in fact been identiﬁ  ed – but policy mechanisms to 
effectively translate these analyses into policy action 
have been lacking. The basic idea here is to multiply 
the capital adequacy ratios with a systemic risk 
factor. Better measures of macroprudential risk are 
to be found. It is argued that leverage ratios, maturity 
mismatch and estimates of bank credit expansion 
should be taken into account.  Highly levered and 
fast growing ’systemic’ institutions would be subject 
to higher capital requirements than the rest. The 
idea is that when there is increasing systemic risk, 
with increasing leverage, maturity mismatch, credit 
expansion and asset price increases during boom 
times, banking capital required should increase, and 
reduce during a downturn when deleveraging takes 
place (Geneva Report, 2009).  
Potential macroprudential tools that could be 
explored further could include:
￿ complementing risk-based capital measures with 
simpler indicators aimed to measure the build-up of 
leverage, with enhanced sensitivity to off-balance 
sheet exposures;  
￿ capital requirements that adjust over the ﬁ  nancial 
cycle; 
￿ loan-loss provisioning standards that incorporate 
all available credit information;
￿ the use of longer historical samples to assess risk 
and margin requirements; and
￿ greater focus on loan-to-value ratios for mortgages.
Further, the challenge is to continually endeavour to 
strike a balance between macro and microprudential 
regulation.
3|2 Regulatory  regime
With the emergence of the shadow banking system 
and other leveraged ﬁ  nancial institutions, the scope 
of regulation and oversight needs to be expanded 
to include all systemically important institutions, 
markets and instruments. Accordingly, the 
perimeter of the ﬁ  nancial sector surveillance would 
have to be extended possibly with differentiated 
layers to allow institutions to graduate from 
simple disclosures to higher levels of prudential 
oversight as their contribution to systemic risks 
increases. Financial authorities will need enhanced 
information on all material ﬁ  nancial institutions and 
markets, including private pools of capital. Large 
complex ﬁ  nancial institutions require particularly 
robust oversight given their size and global reach.   
Consideration would also need to be given to put in 
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regulatory disincentives for such institutions to not 
become too big to fail. The regulatory and oversight 
framework should strive to treat similar institutions 
and activities consistently, with greater emphasis 
on functions and activities and less emphasis on 
legal status.  
The main bone of contention here, inter alia, is 
whether and how to regulate private pools of capital, 
including hedge funds. There have been differences 
with regard to the role of these funds in the current 
global ﬁ  nancial crisis.  Nevertheless, there is a broad 
agreement that private pools of capital, including 
hedge funds, can be a source of risk owing to their 
combined size in the market, their use of leverage 
and maturity mismatches, and their connectedness 
with other parts of the ﬁ  nancial system.   
The widespread reliance of market participants 
on credit ratings of market instruments led to 
inadequate risk analysis by themselves.  Thus, credit 
rating agencies (CRAs) will have to be subject to a 
regulatory oversight regime. Further, there is a need 
for modiﬁ  cations to a rating agency’s practices and 
procedures for managing conﬂ  icts of interest and for 
assuring the transparency and quality of the rating 
process, particularly on the process underlying 
ratings of complex securitised instruments and 
derivatives. Given the global scope of some CRAs, 
the oversight framework should be consistent across 
jurisdictions with appropriate sharing of information 
between national authorities responsible for the 
oversight of CRAs.
3|3   Procyclicality
Once conditions in the ﬁ   nancial system have 
recovered, international standards for capital and 
liquidity buffers will have to be enhanced, and the 
build-up of capital buffers and provisions in good 
times should be encouraged so that capital can absorb 
losses and be drawn down in difﬁ  cult times such as 
the current period. It will be necessary to develop a 
methodology to link the stage in the business cycle 
to capital requirements in a non discretionary way 
and to accounting and prudential standards. 
Many questions have also arisen on accounting 
conventions and procedures that are perceived to 
have added to procyclicality in the ﬁ  nancial system.   
It should be recognised that the clock should not 
be turned back on fair value accounting just to 
address the issue of temporary market illiquidity. 
What is needed is to make clear the nature of price 
uncertainty, and to do so in a manner that speaks 
symmetrically to the potential for mispricing in 
illiquid markets as much as in booming markets. 
Enhancements could include better guidance and 
principles for mark-to-market valuation, information 
on the variance around the fair value calculations 
and data on history price.       
3|4 Prudential  oversight
There are three broad areas with regard to prudential 
oversight that require strengthening: capital 
adequacy framework, liquidity risk management 
and infrastructure for OTC derivatives.
CAPITAL ADEQUACY FRAMEWORK
There is a clear need for higher quantity and 
quality capital resulting in minimum regulatory 
requirements signiﬁ   cantly above existing Basel 
rules. The emphasis should be on Tier I capital. The 
transition to future rules should be carefully phased 
given the importance of maintaining bank lending in 
the current macroeconomic climate. Capital required 
against trading book activities should be increased 
signiﬁ  cantly. Published accounts could also include 
buffers which anticipate potential future losses, 
through, for instance, the creation of an ‘Economic 
Cycle Reserve’. A maximum gross leverage ratio 
could be introduced as a backstop discipline against 
excessive growth in absolute balance sheet size. 
Further, in the context of rapid ﬁ  nancial innovation 
and risk-based regulatory capital requirements, a 
well constructed non-risk-based capital measure can 
at least partially address the problem of modelling 
deﬁ   ciencies for the advanced approaches and 
ensure a minimum level of capital is retained in the 
banking system.
LIQUIDITY RISK MANAGEMENT
A new element in the future regulatory approach 
is explicit recognition that liquidity regulation 
and supervision must be recognised as of equal 
importance to capital regulation. Individual 
institutions have demonstrated that their own 
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internal incentive structure is such that liquidity 
risk may be procyclical due to its links with market 
and credit risk, and to accelerator factors, such as the 
mark-to-market effects of asset values and net worth. 
Structural reliance on short-term wholesale market 
funding, including via securitisation, has increased 
the sensitivity of banks balance sheets and cost of 
funds to procyclical elements. Therefore, regulatory 
policies need to reﬂ  ect appropriately the true price 
of funding liquidity on ﬁ  nancial institutions’ balance 
sheets – ensuring that the market does not rely 
excessively on the central bank emergency liquidity 
support facility. Areas that could be considered 
include:
￿  Improved funding risk management by 
strengthening risk management and governance 
and control.
￿ Introduction of minimum quantitative funding 
liquidity buffers of high-quality liquidity assets.
￿ Introduction of regulatory charge for institutions 
that present a higher than average liquidity risk and 
pricing of access to central bank liquidity in order 
to encourage institutions holding better-quality 
collateral.  
An effective global liquidity framework for 
managing liquidity in large, cross-border ﬁ  nancial 
institutions should include internationally agreed 
levels of liquidity buffers, and should encourage an 
increase in the quality of their composition.  Such a 
framework needs to be comprehensive and take into 
account liquidity needs for the overall institution.
INFRASTRUCTURE FOR OTC DERIVATIVES
The explosion of credit derivatives and their offshoots 
(Collateralised debt obligations – CDOs, CDO2, etc.) 
has demonstrated the clear need for oversight and 
transparency in this market. As noted earlier, the 
market for credit default swaps (CDS) operates on a 
bilateral, OTC basis and has grown to many times the 
size of the market for the underlying credit instruments.  
In light of problems involving some large players in 
this market, attention has focused on the systemic 
risks posed by CDS. There is a global consensus on 
the need for a central counter party (CCP) for all the 
OTC derivative products and accordingly efforts are 
on, both in the United States, European Union and 
elsewhere to implement CCP for CDS.
The development of a CCP facilitates greater market 
transparency, including the reporting of prices for 
CDS, trading volumes, and aggregate open interest.   
The availability of pricing information can improve 
the fairness, efﬁ  ciency, and competitiveness of 
markets — all of which enhance investor protection 
and facilitate capital formation. The degree of 
transparency, of course, depends on the extent of 
participation in the CCP. If needed, some incentives 
may be provided by national authorities, for example, 
by taking a higher capital charge for transactions not 
cleared through central counterparties. In order to 
foster transparency and to promote the use of CCP 
and of exchange trading for credit derivatives, public 
authorities should also encourage the ﬁ  nancial 
industry to standardise contracts and to use a data 
repository for the remaining non-standardised 
contracts and promote fair and open access to central 
counterparty services. In order to mitigate systemic 
risk resulting from counterparty credit risk, in the 
short run, it would also be beneﬁ  cial for there to be a 
competitive environment for central counterparties 
without imposing regulatory requirements that 
unduly fragment the market. 
3|5  Compensation and risk management
COMPENSATION
Among the issues that have gained prominence as 
contributory factors to the emergence of the global 
ﬁ  nancial crisis is the explosion of remuneration 
in the ﬁ  nancial sector, particularly in comparison 
with trends in the rest of the economy.  Much more 
attention is now being given to the development 
of sound practice principles by the international 
standard setters. It is important that reforms in 
this regard be done on an industry-wide basis, so 
that improved risk management and compensation 
practices by some systemically important ﬁ  rms are 
not undermined by the unsound practices of others. 
Along with the enunciation of such principles and 
practices, we need to look more carefully at the 
inherent market incentive structure that has led to 
the observed compensation practices in the ﬁ  nancial 
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sector. Acting on this ﬂ  awed incentive structure 
is more likely to be effective than regulatory 
prescriptions. 
RISK MANAGEMENT
The fundamental weaknesses in risk management 
practices revealed in the current crisis were the 
inability of ﬁ   nancial institutions to adequately 
monitor risk concentrations across products and 
geographical areas, shortcomings in stress testing 
and inappropriate practices for managing risks 
arising from structured products. First and foremost, 
it remains the responsibility of the private sector 
to take the lead in strengthening ﬁ  rm-wide risk 
management frameworks.  Both management and 
the Board of Directors are responsible for putting 
in place adequate risk management and control 
systems. Generally, banks are expected to have in 
place effective internal policies, systems and controls 
to identify, measure, monitor, manage, control and 
mitigate their risk concentrations in a timely manner, 
and under various conditions, including stressed 
market situations. The supervisory authorities would 
have to oversee compliance of such best practices 
for capturing ﬁ  rm-wide risk concentrations arising 
from both on- and off-balance sheet exposures and 
securitisation activities.  
TRANSPARENCY
In recognition of the serious problems that have 
arisen, there is a clear need for greater emphasis on 
greater market transparency about the techniques, 
data characteristics, and the caveats involved in the 
valuation of complex ﬁ  nancial instruments, improved 
information regarding OTC derivatives markets and 
clearing arrangements and reporting of exposures 
in a format that permits regulators to aggregate and 
assess risks to the system as a whole. This would 
help investors to perform some of the due diligence 
currently outsourced to CRAs, while also helping 
the latter to do a better job measuring the tail risks.
The fundamental issue here is two fold: standard 
setters should work with supervisors and regulators 
to reduce complexity in accounting standards to 
facilitate better assessment of uncertainty surround 
valuation and achieve consistency of valuation 
methods and a single set of accounting standards.
ENFORCEMENT
Through the expanded Financial Stability Forum, 
now renamed as Financial Stability Board, the 
International Monetary Fund and the international 
standard setters, international standards, including 
those for macroprudential regulation, the scope of 
regulation, capital adequacy and liquidity buffers, 
should be coordinated to ensure a common and 
coherent international framework, which national 
ﬁ  nancial authorities should apply in their countries 
consistent with national circumstances. The 
ﬁ  nancial regulatory and oversight frameworks and 
their implementation in all G20 countries should be 
reviewed periodically, validated internationally and 
made public.
4| THE CHALLENGES AHEAD
The agenda that is being developed for 
strengthening of ﬁ  nancial sector regulation and 
supervision is ambitious.  Contentious issues will 
arise both at domestic/national regulatory levels 
and at the international levels on regulatory 
cooperation. Whereas the principles that have 
been outlined for this regulatory overhaul are 
being increasingly well accepted, many challenges 
will arise on their modes of implementation, and 
their practicality.
The ﬁ  rst issue is that the various proposals that 
will lead to increased levels of regulatory capital 
over the economic cycle, and extension of such 
capital requirements on bank like institutions that 
are currently unregulated or lightly regulated, 
will inevitably lead to lower proﬁ  tability  for 
equity investors. The bargaining power of banking 
institutions has become weak in the current 
circumstances and hence there is little observable 
protest regarding these proposals at present.   
As the ﬁ  nancial crisis is resolved, and normalcy 
returns, we can expect the ﬁ  nancial industry will 
do its utmost to resist the requirements for higher 
capital at that time. It will be a challenge for 
regulators and governments to resist demands for 
relaxation of the new capital requirements, both the 
enhanced minimum levels and the capital buffers 
proposed in good times. The lobbying power of 
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the ﬁ  nancial industry will be restored by that time 
and hence authorities will need to be prepared for 
such challenges. Lower systemic proﬁ  tability levels 
will also be effective endogenously in limiting 
compensation levels in the ﬁ  nancial sector.  
Second, the proposal for provision of contra-cyclical 
capital will face signiﬁ  cant implementation issues.   
Regulators will need to do signiﬁ  cant technical 
work in the understanding of business cycles so 
that turning points can be recognised. What would 
be the triggers for changes in these capital buffers 
in either direction? Would these changes kick-in in 
anticipation of business cycle turns or post facto?   
How formation or rule-based would these changes 
be so that regulated institutions know in advance 
themselves what they need to do?  An additional 
issue in this sphere arises from the possibility of 
economic cycles occurring at different times in 
different jurisdictions. This would necessitate 
greater cross border cooperation between home 
and host regulators in terms of applicable capital 
requirements for different segments of the same 
international ﬁ  nancial conglomerate.  An additional 
problem for EMEs would be the lack of adequate 
data for business cycle identiﬁ  cation.
Third, there is general agreement on macroprudential 
regulations and the identiﬁ   cation of systemic 
risks like the build up of asset bubbles. However, 
considerable technical work will need to be done at 
both national and international levels on identifying 
what such risks are, what is systemic and what is 
not, and what kind of regulatory actions would be 
effective.  In the recent experience, for example, 
there was ample awareness of the build up of both 
global ﬁ  nancial imbalances, and of the asset price 
bubble, but there was little agreement on what 
needed to be done.  Even if adequate work is done 
on the identiﬁ  cation of systemic risk, and on the 
regulatory measures necessary, what will be the 
enforcement methodology internationally. Within 
national regulatory systems, issues relating to 
inter-regulatory cooperation will also arise, who will 
be in-charge of issuing early warning systems and 
who will listen to them?
Fourth, there is general agreement on the extension 
of regulation on all systemically important 
institutions, markets and instruments.  Here again 
there is an issue of implementation.  How do we 
decide what is systemically important? Considerable 
debate has ranged around the regulation of hedge 
funds, which come in all sizes, shapes and forms.   
Some are large, but not leveraged, others can be both 
large and leveraged, and yet others can be small 
and leveraged or otherwise.  Whereas it may be that 
individual hedge funds or other equity pools are not 
systemically important, they may be so collectively.   
Furthermore, they could be collectively not 
important systemically in good times, but become 
so in times of extensive leveraging.  Similar is the 
story for markets and instruments.  Thus the work of 
national and international regulatory system is cut 
out in this regard.  Excessive regulation could indeed 
snuff out entrepreneurship if not done carefully.
Fifth, a great deal of debate has emerged around the 
issue of securitised credit and its offshoots.  Very 
clearly, ﬁ  nancial innovations in this area have been 
unproductive and dysfunctional and will need to be 
discouraged. Once again, however, securitisation is 
a time honoured methodology that has done much 
to lubricate the ﬁ  nancial system and helped funding 
real economy needs at competitive costs. How these 
instruments are regulated and how “good” ﬁ  nancial 
innovations will be winnowed from the “bad” 
will be a challenge.
Sixth, as the current global crisis has shown, 
whereas many of the large complex ﬁ  nancial 
institutions are global in nature, their regulation is 
national.  Considerable discussion is now ongoing 
on how international regulatory cooperation can 
be enhanced.  Apart from the regulatory problems 
associated with ongoing institutions, even more 
difﬁ  cult are the problems associated with cross border 
resolution of failing institutions. The discussion on 
these issues has just began.
Seventh, from the point of view of EMEs, at the 
macro level, the volatility in capital ﬂ  ows has led 
to severe problems in both macromanagement and 
ﬁ  nancial regulation (Committee on Global Financial 
System – CGFS –, 2009).  These capital ﬂ  ows have 
been inﬂ  uenced signiﬁ  cantly by the extant monetary 
policy regimes in developed countries and hence 
their volatility is not necessarily related to economic 
conditions in the receiving economies.  Excess ﬂ  ows, 
sudden stops and reversals have signiﬁ  cant effects 
on EME ﬁ  nancial sectors, the working of their capital 
markets, and asset prices, and hence their economies 
as a whole.  Management of this volatility involves 
action in monetary policy, ﬁ  scal  management, 
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capital account management, and also ﬁ  nancial 
market regulation.  This will remain a challenge since 
there is little international discussion on this issue.
Finally, in response to the crisis, monetary policy 
has been loosened substantially in major advanced 
economies since the second half of 2007. Policy rates 
have been cut to near zero levels, even lower than 
that in 2003-04, and the ﬁ  nancial systems have been 
ﬂ  ooded with large liquidity. Abundant liquidity, if 
not withdrawn quickly, runs the risk of inducing the 
same excesses and imbalances that were witnessed 
during 2003-07. Excess liquidity could also take the 
form of large capital ﬂ  ows to the EMEs and their 
likely recycling back to the advanced economies. As 
the global economy starts recovery, a calibrated exit 
from this unprecedented accommodative monetary 
policy will have to be ensured to avoid the recurrence 
of the ﬁ  nancial crisis being experienced now.
To summarise, the emergence of the global ﬁ  nancial 
crisis has led to a new wave of thinking on all issues 
related to both monetary policy and ﬁ  nancial 
regulation. Whereas considerable progress has been 
achieved on the principles governing this regulatory 
overhaul, very signiﬁ  cant challenges remain on the 
implementation issues that will arise as we move 
into a new regime globally.
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